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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

KIM CHALMER DAVIS,

]

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

i

TERRIE LEE DAVIS,

Case No. 880452-CA

]

Defendant and Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW:
I.

JURISDICTION

This is an appeal from a Decree of Divorce entered in the Fifth
Judicial District Court.

Jurisdiction of this appeal is vested in

the Utah Court of Appeals by virtue of the provisions of Utah Code
Annotated §78-2(a)-3 (2) (h) and Rule 3 of the Rules of the Utah Court
of Appeals.
II.

NATURE AND PROCEEDINGS

This is an appeal from those portions of the Findings of Fact
and

Conclusions

of

Law

and

Decree

of

Divorce

entered

by

the

Honorable J. Philip Eves, Fifth District Court Judge, which address
the issue of alimony.

Judge Eves had ordered alimony in an amount

less than that recommended by the Court Commissioner after reviewing
the transcript of proceedings held before Court Commissioner Howard
H. Maetani pursuant to Fifth District Local Administrative Rule 10.

III.
1.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Where the trial of an action for divorce has been submitted

to a Court Commissioner sitting by Local Administrative Order and
not by consent of the parties and the Commissioner hears evidence
and makes a recommendation concerning Findings of Fact, is the
District Court Judge to whom an objection to the Commissioner's
Order is taken bound to follow that recommendation unless clearly
erroneous

or

may

the

District

Court

exercise

its

independent

judgment in the matter?
2.

Did Appellant waive her right to appeal the scope of the

District Court's review of this case by failing to object when the
Court advised the parties in open court of the scope of its review,
that is, of its intent to make its own findings upon review of the
record?
3.

Did Fifth District Court Judge J. Philip Eves abuse his

discretion or misapply the law when he awarded Appellant alimony in
the amount of $50.00 per month for two years?
IV. STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE
Utah Code Annotated §78-3-16
Whenever all the parties to any cause pending in a district
court or their attorneys of record shall enter into a written
stipulation appointing a judge pro tempore for the trial of the
cause, and the person appointed shall take and subscribe an oath to
faithfully try and determine the issues joined between the party or
parties plaintiff, naming them, and the party or parties defendant,
naming them, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the court in which
such action is pending to attach together said stipulation and oath,
and to place them on file, and also to record them at length upon
the minutes of the court; whereupon the person appointed shall be
vested with the same power and authority and shall be charged with
the same duties as to the cause in and as to which he is appointed
as if he were the regularly elected and qualified judge of the
district court; provided, that parties may, by the terms of their
stipulation, limit the power of the judge pro tempore to the trial
and determination of any specified issue or issues, either of law or
-.0-

fact, and in such case the oath of the person appointed shall
correspond to the terms of the stipulation. (Repealed April 25,
1988.)
V.
Plaintiff

sued

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

the Defendant

for divorce.

The matter was

referred to Howard H. Maetani, Court Commissioner, pursuant to Local
Administrative
evidence

and

Rule
made

10.

a

Commissioner

recommendation

that

Maetani

heard

Defendant

be

the

awarded

rehabilitative alimony in the amount of $200.00 per month for a
period of four years.
recommendation.

Plaintiff filed a timely objection to that

Shortly after the objection was filed the matter

was called for hearing before the Honorable J. Philip Eves, Fifth
District Court Judge.

At that hearing held April 12, 1988, Judge

Eves advised counsel concerning his intent to make his own findings
based on the evidence in the record.

Neither party objected.

The

District Court then reviewed the record and reduced the alimony
award to $50.00 a month for two years.
entered consistent with that reduction.
VI.
Respondent concurs

A Decree of Divorce was

This appeal followed.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
in the

statement of

facts submitted by

Appellant, supplemented as follows:
Shortly

after

Respondent

filed

his

objection

to

the

Commissioner's recommendation the matter was called before the Fifth
District Court, the Honorable J. Philip Eves presiding, for hearing.
At that hearing the Court asked Respondent's counsel to indicate
whether he was requesting a new trial and the Court proposed an
alternative, that is, that the Court "review the transcript of what
the

Commissioner

did

[to]

see

-3-

if

[the

Court]

would

do

it

differently".

Later on the Court stated "If the record contains

sufficient evidence upon which I can make my own findings then I
would probably do so in this case where the issues are limited".
(Transcript of April 12, 1988, hearing at 4 through 6)

Neither

party objected to the Court's notice of intent to make its own
findings.
Appellant testified that while employed at Leisure Sports, from
roughly November, 1987, and until Easter, 1988, (Transcript of trial
at 47) she would earn $5.50 an hour (Transcript of trial at 45) and
that she expected to earn minimum wage when not working at Leisure
Sports (Transcript of trial at 64).
Neither party submitted any specific evidence at trial with
regard

to monthly

living

expenses.

However, both

parties

had

submitted Full Disclosure Financial Declarations in conjunction with
an earlier hearing on the issue of temporary support.

The Domestic

Commissioner made no specific findings with regard to the financial
needs and conditions of either party except to find that Plaintiff
has a gross historical monthly income of approximately $1,500.00 to
$1,700.00

while

approximately

the

Defendant

has

$500.00 to $550.00

a

gross

(R. 82).

monthly

income

of

Upon considering the

matter, the Trial Court also made no specific finding with regard to
the ability of the Plaintiff to pay alimony but did find that while
Defendant claimed monthly household expenses of $1,195.00 in a Full
Disclosure

Financial

Declaration

previously

submitted,

she

had

testified on the date of trial that she had been able to maintain
the household well on $800.00 per month approximately two years ago

-4-

when Plaintiff was also a member of the household.

With that

$800.00 she was able to pay for the mortgage, the utilities, the
dental expenses, the medical expenses and food, and she could use
what was left over for whatever else she needed
216-217).

(Transcript at

For a period of time she also paid the phone bill out of

that money

(Transcript at 216).

The only testimony offered by

either party with reference to anticipated household expenses was in
the form of an acknowledgment by Plaintiff that the Full Disclosure
Financial

Declaration

he

had

filed

in

July,

1987, accurately

reflected his expenses as far as he could calculate it (Transcript
at 155) and Defendant's acknowledgment that the expenses listed in
her Full Disclosure Financial Declaration "basically" reflected what
her monthly

needs were

to maintain

herself

and

the

children.

(Transcript at 215)
As per the Full Disclosure Financial Declaration submitted by
the Plaintiff on July 30, 1987, the Plaintiff's monthly expenses,
excluding the mortgage on the home, were $1,793.92

(R 24).

The

Defendant's anticipated expenses each month as per her earlier filed
Full Disclosure Financial Statement, excluding the amount of the
mortgage payment of $284.00, were "basically" $1,195.00

(R. 51,

215) .
VII.
Commissioner

Maetani's

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Recommendation was

a recommendation.

The matter had been submitted to Commissioner Maetani pursuant to
Local Administrative Rule and not by consent of the parties.

Cases

that discuss the binding effect of a master's factual findings when
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the case

is referred

therefore

do

not

to the master by consent of the parties

apply.

A

court

commissioner's

recommendation

concerning Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law does not remove
from the District Court the right and the responsibility to exercise
its own best judgement with regard to resolution of disputed factual
and legal issues.

That is especially so where, as in this case, the

credibility of the witnesses is not so much in dispute as is the
conclusion to be drawn from the evidence.
At the time this matter was submitted to the Trial Court for a
determination

of

Respondent's

objections

to

the

Commissioner's

Recommendation, the Trial Court indicated its intent to exercise
its own

judgment

in reviewing

the record

and making

findings.

Neither party objected to that statement concerning the intended
scope of the District Court's review.

Appellant should not now be

permitted to claim that the Trial Court erred when it did precisely
what it said it would do and neither party had objected at that
time.
When all of the factors relevant to the issue of alimony are
considered, Judge Eves' Findings and Decree are clearly not an abuse
of

discretion

nor

a

misapplication

of

the

law.

Commissioner

Maetani's recommendation specifically addresses and makes factual
findings concerning the parties' respective incomes.

However, the

Commissioner did not make findings concerning all of the factors
necessary to a determination of alimony.

The Commissioner made no

finding concerning the needs of the Defendant or the ability of the
Plaintiff to provide spousal support.
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The District Court did make

additional findings after a review of the record.

In light of those

findings, it is apparent that the District Court's decree should be
upheld on appeal.
VIII.

ARGUMENT

I.
WHERE TRIAL IN A DIVORCE CASE IS SUBMITTED TO A COURT
COMMISSIONER FOR THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE PURSUANT TO LOCAL
ADMINISTRATIVE RULE AND NOT BY CONSENT OF THE PARTIES, THE
RECOMMENDATION OF THE COURT COMMISSIONER TO THE DISTRICT COURT IS
ADVISORY ONLY.
Parties can waive procedural and constitutional rights; parties
may consent to have someone other than the Court hear and make final
determinations on issues of fact.

Davis vs. Schwartz, 155 U.S. 631,

39 L. Ed. 289, 15 S. Ct. 237 (1894) is cited by Appellant for the
proposition

that

recommendation

a District Judge

supported

by

the

is not

evidence.

free to disregard

a

However, Appellant's

analysis of that case overlooks a critical factor on which the U.S.
Supreme Court based its analysis.

The Court stated:

"The Trial

Court could not, of its motion, or upon the request of one party,
abdicate its duty to determine by its own judgment the controversy
presented, and devolve that duty upon any of its officers...[unless]
the parties

select

and

agree upon a special

settlement of their controversy..."

tribunal

155 U.S. at 239.

for the

In that case

the Court concluded that since the reference to the master was by
consent the findings of the master were entitled to a presumption of
correctness.

In this case, the matter was not submitted to a Court

Commissioner by consent of the parties.
pursuant to Local Administrative Order 10.
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The matter was submitted

Administrative Order No. 10 signed by the Honorable J. Philip
Eves, Fifth District Court Judge, on September 16, 1987, provides:
Pursuant
to
Section
30-3-4.1
through
Section
30-3-4.4, all domestic relations matters in Iron and
Washington Counties, including orders to show case,
pretrial conferences, petitions for modification of
divorce decree, scheduling conferences and all other
applications for relief, excepting ex parte motions,
shall be referred to the Court Commissioner upon
filing with the county clerk.
In all matters referred to the Commissioner, the
Commissioner shall review all pleadings and conduct
hearings for the purpose of submitting recommendations to
the Court. At such hearings, the Court Commissioner may
require the personal appearance of the parties and their
counsel, upon notice; may require the filing of financial
disclosure statements and settlement proposals; may obtain
child custody evaluations from the Division of Family
Services or private agencies under Section 55-15b-6(11),
Utah Code Ann (1953, as Amended) and may receive evidence,
by direct testimony or proffer.
The Court Commissioner shall, after hearing any
motion or other application for relief, recommend entry of
an Order by the Court and shall make a written
Recommendation and Order to the • Court as to each matter
heard.
The oral recommendation of the Commissioner shall
constitute the Order of this Court in the subject case
until either reduced to writing in a Recommendation and
Order or modified by Order of the District Court.
The written Recommendation and Order shall contain
the preceding paragraph, which should be in bold type and
which should constitute the first paragraph of the
document.
Should the parties object to the Recommendation and
Order, the matter shall be referred to the District Judge
for further disposition, which shall consist of a review
of the record relating to the stated objections.
The Recommendation and Order shall contain the
following:
a. The above referred paragraph.
b. The recommendation of the commissioner.
c. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree
of Divorce or other appropriate order.
Any party objecting to the Recommendation and Order
shall, within ten days of the entry of the Commissioner's
Recommendation and Order, provide notice to the District
Court, the Commissioner and opposing counsel that the
recommended order is not acceptable. Objections to the
Commissioner's recommendation must be specific regarding
each matter to which the party objects. If no objection
-8-

is made within ten days, the party shall be deemed to have
consented to entry of an order in conformance with the
Commissioner's Recommendation and Order. In the event a
Recommendation
and
Order
is
objected
to,
the
Commissioner's Recommendation and Order shall stand
pending the final outcome of further disposition by the
District Judge.
In all matters wherein the parties do not object to
the Recommendation and Order, the Recommendation and Order
shall become the final Order and Decree of the District
Court automatically, upon the expiration of ten days
following the signing of the Recommendation and Order by
the Commissioner. The signatures of the District Judge
shall not be required.
Default, contested and uncontested divorces shall
also be heard by the Commissioner -. unless otherwise
directed by the Court. (Emphasis added)
Local Administrative

Order No. 10 requires that the Court

Commissioner hear uncontested divorces unless otherwise directed by
the Court but does not give the litigants the opportunity for a
trial by the Court.
Commissioner's

That rule also provides that review of the

recommendation would

consist of a review of the

record relating to the stated objections but does not specify the
standard of review to be applied.
Other cases cited by the Appellant in support of her argument
concerning

the

recommendation
Davis.

proposed
are

binding

founded

effect

of

the

Commissioner's

on the same rationale enunciated

in

The parties may, by their consent, have someone other than

the Court hear a case and make findings.

In the State of

In Wiscombe vs. Wiscombe, 744 P.2d 1024 (Ut. App. 1987) the Utah
Court of Appeals indicates that "Hearings before the domestic
relations commissioner are based solely on proffers, without formal
submission of evidence or testimony." That was not the practice in
the Fifth District.
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Florida, Rule 1.490 of the Rules of Civil Procedure dealing with the
appointment of masters provides:
"(c) Reference,
No reference shall be to a master, either
general v or special, without the consent of the parties. When a
reference is made to a master, either party may set the action for
hearing before him". 30A Florida Statutes Annotated at 350, Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 1.490(C).
Each

case

cited

by

Appellant

from the

State

of Florida

is

really a restatement of the doctrine set forth in Davis; Once the
parties have waived their right to have the Court hear the evidence
by selecting another tribunal they can not, after the fact, object
to the findings of that mutually agreeable substitute for the Court
unless those findings are clearly erroneous.

One of the very first

cases in the State of Florida to acknowledge the binding effect of
the

findings

of

a master

was

specifically

having consented to that procedure.

based

on

the

parties

In Harmon vs. Harmon, 40 So.

2d. 209 (Florida 1949) the Court stated:
"Parenthetically, this court has allied itself with those
courts which place added importance on the reports of masters to
whom matters are submitted by agreement of the parties, [citations
omitted] In such situations it has been said by this Court that the
findings have the weight of the verdict of a jury." 40 So. 2d at
213.
The State of Illinois acknowledges the same rule concerning the
binding affect of the findings of a master appointed by consent of
the parties.

In People ex rel. Reiter vs. Lupe, 89 NE 2d 824 (111.

1950) the Court concluded that the Defendants would be deprived of
their

fundamental right to the decision of a master who

witnesses

on the

stand

and heard

all their testimony

saw the

if

another

master were to review the matter on the record alone and substitute
its judgment for that of the master who heard the evidence.
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That

decision must be reviewed in light of two critical facts: 1) A
master at chancery in the State of Illinois was a judicial officer
whose position in the judicial branch of government is acknowledged
in

the

Illinois

State

Constitution.

A

magistrate

is

now

an

"Associate Judge" pursuant to Article 6 section 8 of the Illinois
State Constitution.
years.

An Associate Judge has a term of office of four

He is appointed by the Circuit Court Judges in accordance

with procedures that the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois
establishes by rule and an Associate Judge hears matters determined
2
by Supreme Court rule.
Due process as per the Illinois State
Constitution contemplates a hearing by a magistrate or Associate
Judge.

There

Constitution.

is

no

comparable

provision

in

the

State

2) A recent case in the State of Illinois clarifies

the effect of a magistrate's report to the Court.
National Bank vs. City of Chicago, (294 N.E. 2d. 42
1973).

Utah

In Oak Park
(111. App.

A master had been appointed but had died before completing

his report.

The parties had consented to have a successor master

prepare the report.
and appealed.

Appellant disagreed with that master's findings

The Court of Appeals held that the parties were bound

by their agreement to have the successor prepare the report and went
on to discuss the significance to be attached to the report.
"Furthermore, and finally, although the findings of a master,
approved by the Trial Court are entitled to due weight on review the
master's report is advisory only. After filing of the report, the
facts remain open for consideration by the Trial Court and by the
reviewing court. This Court will make its own determination as to

111. Const. 1870, Art. VI, Sec. 8. S.H.A, effective January 1,
1964.

-11-

whether...'the decree rendered by the Court [was] a proper one under
the law and the evidence. ..' Without regard to the finding of the
master upon any particular question of fact". 204 Ne. 2d. at 45.
In Illinois the findings of the master appear to be advisory only.
In McDonald vs. Kenney, 140 SW. 999 (Ark. 1911) the Supreme
Court of the State of Arkansas acknowledged that parties can agree
to have someone else settle a controversy but "Parties have a right
to have a court determine by its own judgment the questions of fact
and of law involved in any controversy".

If the parties agree that

a special tribunal can hear and settle the matter then they will be
deemed

to

have

waived

certain

selection of a hearing officer.

rights with

reference

to

their

However, where the parties have

had no say in the selection of the particular officer to hear the
case then the matter

should be decided by the Court... in this

instance the Fifth District Court Judge.
In Utah, the necessity of consent of the parties prior to the
appointment of someone to hear a case other than a judge was found
in the Utah Constitution, Article VIII Section 5 until repealed in
1984.

The Constitution does not now suggest a different rule

except that the specific language providing for the appointment of
non judges to sit as judges pro tempore by consent of the parties
has been deleted.

However, at the time this matter was heard,

consent of the parties was critical.
U.C.A §30-3-15.3(2) requires the written consent of the parties
before a judge pro tempore, master or referee can hear certain
matters.
Rule 53 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is essentially
the same as Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

-12-

One

glaring difference is the requirement that, for the appointment of a
master

to hear

cases other

than those where

"some exceptional

condition requires," the consent of the parties is necessary. URCP
Rule 53(b).
At the time this matter was heard, UCA §78-3-16, provided for
the appointment of a judge pro tempore upon "written stipulation" of
the parties.
The rule that the decision of a Court Commissioner in Utah is
advisory only is especially applicable in this case where the issue
in dispute is not one that requires the Trial Court to pass upon the
credibility of witnesses.

In this instance neither Plaintiff or

Defendant offered direct testimony concerning financial need except
Defendant's

testimony

concerning

the

Plaintiff was also residing in the home.

household

expenses

when

Other testimony concerning

financial need was offered by way of incorporating prior testimony
in the form of Full Disclosure Financial Declarations filed with the
Court in July of 1988.
In Anderson vs. Dewey, 350 P. 2d. 734 (Idaho 1960) a successor
judge, upon consideration of a motion for new trial, vacated certain
of the findings of the trial judge.

The Appellant appealed claiming

deprivation of due process since the successor judge had not heard
the evidence.

That Court stated:

"However, in a case where the successor judge, in
resolving the issues raised by a motion for a new trial,
is not required to weigh conflicting evidence or pass upon
the credibility of witnesses, but can resolve such issues
upon questions of law, or upon evidence which is not
materially in conflict, he may exercise the same authority
as could the judge who tried the case". 350 P.2d. at 737

-13-

In

this

instance

the

testimony

offered

with

Defendant's needs was offered by Defendant herself.

regard

to

There was no

need to resolve disputed evidence submitted by each party.

If there

was a need to resolve any conflict in the testimony it would involve
resolving the conflict between Defendant's own testimony and her
prior filed Full Disclosure Financial Statement which "basically"
stated

her

monthly

expenses.

In

such

an

instance

it

is

not

necessary for the court determining the matter to actually hear the
party

testify.

Even

if

the

"live" testimony

were

entitled

to

greater weight, Judge Eves was entitled to find, as he did, that the
child support, when added to Defendant's income, met her and the
children's needs.
In order for Respondent to have been deprived of his opportunity
to have

a District

Court

exercise . its independent

judgment in

resolving disputed issues of fact he must have consented to a waiver
of that right.
was

referred

Administrative
discretion

In this case no such waiver occurred.
to

the

Rule.

and heard

Court
The

Commissioner

Court

evidence

Commissioner

to

exercised

and made a recommendation.

recommendation may assist the trier of fact
Judge

pursuant

This matter

but it is advisory only.

Local
his
That

the District Court

Any other rule would deprive

Plaintiff of due process of law.
II.
APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE TRIAL COURT'S STATEMENT
CONCERNING THE SCOPE OF ITS REVIEW OF THE COMMISSIONER'S
RECOMMENDATION CONSTITUTES A WAIVER OF ANY OBJECTION TO THE
PROCEDURE FOLLOWED BY THE TRIAL COURT IN REVIEWING THE RECORD AND
EXERCISING ITS INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT WITH REFERENCE TO THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED.
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At the hearing held April 12, 1988, the Trial Court invited
counsel to either request a new trial or request that the matter be
submitted

for

proceedings

the

on

the

Commissioner.

At

transcript

his

independent judgment with reference to the matters in dispute.

The

it

clear

that

he

intended

that

of

exercise

made

Domestic

review

the

Court

the

Court's

time

Trial

before

Trial

to

Trial Court stated: "If the record contains sufficient evidence upon
which I can make my own findings, then I would probably do so in
this case where the issues are limited"
1988,

hearing

at

6).

Obviously,

the

(Transcript of April 12,
Trial

Court

intended

to

exercise its independent judgment with reference to its review of
the facts.

No objection was made to that procedure at the time.

Appellant, having failed to object at that time, should not now be
permitted to raise that objection and question the practice of the
Trial Court in that regard.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DESCRETION AND DID
MISAPPLY THE LAW IN AWARDING ALIMONY IN THE AMOUNT INDICATED.

NOT

At the trial of this matter evidence was presented concerning
each party's ability

to produce

income.

Despite Appellant's own

testimony that, during the ski season, she was able to earn $5.50
per hour, or the equivalent of over $900.00 a month, and that she
expected to earn minimum wage, approximately $575.00 a month, during
other times of the year, the Court Commissioner and the District
Court

concluded

between
Appellant

$500.00
had

that
and
an

she

had

$550.00

historical

an
per

historical
month.

earning

-15-

earning

They

capacity

capacity

also
of

found

of

that

approximately

$1,500.00 to $1,700,00.

The Court Commissioner cited language from

Paffel vs. Paffel, 732 P. 2d. 96 (Ut. 1986), referred to Boyle vs.
Boyle, , 735 P. 2d. 669 (Utah App. 1987) and indicated that it had
considered the factors relevant to a determination of alimony, to
wit: "1) financial conditions and needs of the wife; 2) the ability
of the wife to produce a sufficient income for herself, and 3) the
ability of the husband to provide support." Jones vs. Jones, 700 P.
2d. 1072 (Utah 1985) as cited in Boyle vs. Boyle.

The Commissioner

did not make any factual findings on any issue regarding alimony
except the parties' income.
make any

factual

Because the Commissioner failed to

finding with

reference to the ability

of the

Respondent to provide support or the financial condition and needs
of Appellant, the District Court had no alternative but to review
the record and make findings.
The District Court, upon reviewing the record, found that the
Appellant's needs were "met or nearly so" by her ability to earn
$550.00

per

month

and

the

$350.00

child

support

recommended.

Appellant had testified that she was able to maintain the needs of
the household with $800.00 per month when Respondent was also a
member of the household

and that she and had money left over.

Respondent's absence from the household would obviously reduce the
amount necessary to pay basic household expenses and therefore allow
Appellant

additional

disposable

income

for

other

purposes.

Appellant's needs are met, or nearly so, when her income is combined
with the child support ordered.
regard

to Appellant's

financial

The Trial Court's finding with
condition

and

needs

are

amply

supported by the evidence and the alimony awarded is consistent with
those findings.
-16-

IX.

CONCLUSION

This case was not heard by the Court Commissioner by consent of
the parties but was heard pursuant to Local Administrative Rule.
Were this Court to rule that the Court Commissioner's findings were
binding upon the parties, Respondent will have been denied due
process of law:

the right to have the District Court Judge exercise

its independent judgment with reference to disputed issues of fact.
However, Appellant has waived her right to object to the practice
followed by the District Court Judge in this instance by failing to
object at the time the scope of the Court's intended review was
explained to counsel for the parties.

Finally, the decision of the

District Court Judge is amply supported by the record.
Court Judge, the Honorable

J.

Philip Eves, did

The District

not abuse his

discretion nor did he misapply the law.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

' day of October, 1988.
GALLIAN & WESTFALL

By:
G. Michael Westfall
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed four copies of the above and
foregoing Brief of Respondent to Gary W. Pendleton 150 North 200
East, Suite 202, St. George, Utah
84770, on the
day of
October, 1988.
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT* C Q U R g ^ m ^ / ^
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
••••••*

Case Number

KIM CHALMAR DAVIS,

CV 87 1309

Plaintiff,
vs.

RECOMMENDATION

TERRIE LEE DAVIS,
Defendant,
*••••***

The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing
before the Domestic Relations Commissioner on February 24, 1988,
at which time the court took the matter under advisement.

The

court having considered testimony and upon being advised in the
premises now finds and concludes as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff is a resident of Washington County and

has been a resident of Washington County for at least three
months prior to the commencement of this action.
2.

Plaintiff

and

defendant

are husband

and wife,

having been married at Beaver, Utah, on June 23, 1978.
3.

There have been two children born as issue of the

marriage, namely:

Brittany Lee Davis, born May 28, 1979; and Kim

Clayton Davis, born June 11, 1982
4.

During

the

course

of

the

marriage

defendant

admitted having been involved in several physical and emotional
relationships with various paramours causing the plaintiff great

mental distress and suffering; therefore, plaintiff is awarded a
divorce from defendant on the grounds of mental cruelty.
5.
factors

The

in

court

determining

considers

permanent

numerous

custody,

function-related

including

but

not

limited to the following as discussed briefly in Pusey v. Pusey,
728 P.2d

117

(Utah 1986), and set out more fully In Atkinson,

Criteria for Deciding Child Custody in the Trial and Appellate
Courts, 18 Fam. L. Q. 1 (Spring 1984):
a.

Primary caretaker:

One of the most important

factors in the child custody determination is who has been the
primary caretaker

of the child.

The parent who has been the

primary caretaker particularly when the child is young, usually
has a closer relationship with the'child and is more experienced
in meeting the child 1 s needs.

In addition to indicating parental

experience and a close relationship with the child, the parent
who

has

been

commitment
evidence

in
is

the

primary

caring
likely

for
to

caretaker - also
the

child

continue.

has

demonstrated

which,

barring

Factors

which

a

contrary
would

be

considered to determine which parent is a primary caretaker are
as follows:
(1) preparing and planning of meals;
(2) bathing, grooming and dressing;
(3) purchasing, cleaning and caring of clothes;
(4) medical care, including nursing and
to physician;

o

trips

(5) arranging alternate care, i.e. babysitting,
day care, etc.;
(6) putting child to bed at night, attending to
child in the middle of the night, waking child in the morning;
(7) disciplining, i.e. teaching general manners
and toilet training;
(8) education, i.e. religious, cultural, etc.
The court finds that while both parties are capable of caring for
the child, the weight of the evidence presented leans towards the
defendant as the primary caretaker of the parties minor children
throughout the marriage.
b.

Time available to spend with child:

A factor

related to the identity of the primary caretaker is which parent
has more

time available

to spend

with the child.

While

the

primary caretaker factor looks primarily to time spent with the
"child in the past, the factor--of time available to spend with the
child looks to the future.
the evidence presented

The court finds that the weight of

indicates that plaintiff will have more

time available to spend with the children than the defendant.
c.

Stability of environment:

If the child has had

a more stable and secure relationship with one parent than the
other,

custody

stability.

usually

The

would

custody

go

to

evaluation

the

parent

conducted

offering
by

V.

more

Gerald

Thamert, L.C.S.W., and the psychological evaluation conducted by
Richard Y. Moody, Ph.D., psychologist, indicate that the children
of the parties have bonded very significantly with the defendant

and "being younger minor children, they have a need to continue
said bonding; therefore, they recommended

that the defendant is

at this time the most fit and proper person to be awarded the
custody of the minor children of the parties.
Further, two other considerations related to stability
are the child's school performance and health care.

The evidence

shows that the health needs of the children have been met and
there is no evidence to the contrary that the children are not
performing well academically in school.
d.

Abuse and neglect:

Abuse and neglect of a

child obviously can be a determinative factor in custody cases.
The abuse can be physical or verbal.

Standards regarding abuse

do not prohibit physical punishment.

Parents or guardians may

use corporal punishment to discipline their children so long as
the force used is not designed or known to create a substantial
risk of death, serious bodily injury, disfigurement, extreme pain
or mental distress or gross degradation.

The court finds no

abuse of the parties children at this time.
Neglect includes lack of supervision of the child, poor
appearance of the child, lack of attention to health needs, and
inadequate provisions of food, clothing or shelter.

The court

finds no serious neglect of the parties children; however, the
testimony and evidence presented compels the court to advise both
parties to insure proper supervision of their children when they
are in their custody.

A

e.

Alcohol and drug problems:

Another obvious

factor in custody determination is a parent's drinking or drug
problems.

The testimony presented indicates that defendant has

used marijuana and perhaps controlled

substance; however, the

court is not convinced that the defendant has an alcohol problem.
f.

Mental instability:

Mental instability, along

with alcohol and drug problems appear as factors approximately
twice as often in initial custody determinations as they do in
modification cases.

Presumably parents who have those problems

are more likely to have had them for a long time rather than have
developed them in between the period of initial custody determination.

In many instances, the problems may have contributed to

the divorce.
In most cases in -.which a mental health picture
draws the attention of the court, the problem is severe, with the
patient in question either having attempted"1-suicide or having
been hospitalized.
problems

are

Although a parent's current mental health

highly

relevant

parent's past problems

to

a custody

determination, a

in which the parent has recovered or

current problems which are considered to not affect the children
are not grounds for denying custody.

In consideration of the

evidence and testimony presented before the court, the court does
not believe that the defendant is mentally unstable.
g.

Non-marital sexual relationships:

Although

there is a divergence in the manner in which the court's deal
with

not-marital

relationships, there are some situations on

which most court's agree.
relationship which

A parent who has a discreet sexual

the child

is not aware of would not lose

custody because of the affair, unless the parent is spending so
much time away from home that the child is not being properly
cared for.

A parent who has a relationship of which the child

might be aware, but refrains from engaging in sex when the child
is home, will also usually not lose custody.

A parent who

terminates an affair is not likely to resume it would not likely
lose custody because of the affair.
At the other end of the spectrum, a parent who has
multiple lovers in a short period of time and whose children are
aware of the relationship will lose custody—especially if the
parent shows other signs of instability.

In addition, a parent

who has her lover over when the children are at home and places
the children

in a particularly embarrassing situation

is not

likely to gain custody.
In between the extremes is a lot of gray area in
which case turn on the degree to which a court will presume,
without specific proof that a non-marital sexual relationship is
harmful to a child.
Non-marital

relationships,

like

marriages,

vary

considerably in their quality and in their impact on children.
Some will have a positive impact; others will have a negative
impact; and some may be a mixture of both.

While the specific

nature of a particular relationship may lead to a justifiable
presumption that the impact of the child will be negative, a
6

negative presumption should not apply to all non-marital sexual
relationships.
In
presented,

Each case must be examined on its own facts.
consideration

the

court

does

of

the

testimony

not believe

that

and

evidence

defendant's

extra

marital actions has created a negative impact upon the parties'
minor children at this time.
h.

Child's

preference:

The

weight

given

the

child's preference will vary with the child's age, intelligence
and maturity.

The court will not put the child in a situation

where they must choose which parent they will live with, as that
will create a situation in which influence and manipulation would
abound.

The court finds that pursuant to the custody evaluation

and psychological evaluation submitted, both children love both
of their parents and want to maintain a relationship with both
parents.
i.

Joint custody:

The minimum criteria for joint

custody is as follows:
(1)

Both parties are fit;

(2)

both desire continuous

involvement

with

(3)

both parents are seen by the child as a

the children;

source of security and love;
(4)

both

parents

will

communicate

and

cooperate in promoting the children's best interests.
Obviously the most important criteria for issuing a
joint custody order

is cooperation of the parents.
7

The court

finds that in this case both parents are fit; they both desire
continuous involvement with their children; that plaintiff and
defendant are seen by the minor children as a source of security
and love; however, the court finds that both parents are unable
to

communicate

and

cooperate

at

this

time

in promoting

the

successful joint custody situation.
j.

Split custody;

The court is reluctant to split

children because close family relationships should be encouraged;
brothers and sisters need each others strengths and associations
in the every day and often common experiences and to separate
them

unnecessarily

situation.

is

likely

to

be a traumatic

and

harmful

In addition, siblings particularly need each others

support to deal with the strain of divorce.

The court considered

split custody in this situation; however, the court is looking
for the best interests of the children and not a solution that
will satisfy the parties at the expense of the children.
pursuant

to

the

custodial

evaluation

and

the

Again,

psychological

evaluation submitted to the court, the court finds that a split
custody situation in this matter is without merit.
Pursuant
psychological

to

evaluation

the

custody

submitted

to

the

evaluation
court

and

and
in

consideration of the aforementioned paragraphs above, the court
finds that defendant on a temporary basis is a fit and proper
person to be awarded the care, custody and control of the parties
minor children, and that such award is in the children's best
interests

subject

to

reasonable

visitation

rights

in

the

defendant and contingencies set out in paragraphs 6 and 7 below.
A

b.

The mother shall have the children on Mother's

Day and her birthday, and the father shall have the children on
Father's Day and his birthday.
c.

Every other state and national holiday.

d.

One-half of the Christmas vacation, i.e. when

the children's Christmas vacation commences until 1:00 p.m. on
Christmas Day for the year 1988 and from 1:00 p.m. Christmas Day
until one day before the children need to return to school in
1989, and the parties to alternate the division of the Christmas
vacation each subsequent year thereafter.
e.

Four weeks of summer visitation to be elected

by the plaintiff between the months of June, July or August for
1988.

Commencing 1989 five weeks summer visitaiton between the

months of June, July and August.
f.
prompt

manner

accordingly.

so

All visitation periods shall be exercised in a
that

both

parties

can - make

their

plans

The noncustodial parent shall pick the children up

from the front steps of the custodial parent's residence no
earlier than 15 minutes prior and no later than 15 minutes after
the visitation period commences.

Return of the children to the

front steps of the custodial parent's residence shall also be
subject to the 15 minute rule.

The custodial parent shall have

the children fed and ready on time for visitation with sufficient
clothing packed and ready for the visitation period.
g.

In the event the children are ill and unable

to visit, a makeup visitation will be allowed to the noncustodial
parent on the next succeeding weekend.
10

6.

It is in the children's best interests to have the

noncustodial parent involved in their lives including such areas
as school, sports, church, scouting and other activities in which
the child has an interest.
for advising

The custodial parent is responsible

the noncustodial parent of particular

events of

progress of the child in their custody.
7.
defendant's-

While
temporary

the

parties

custody,

minor

children

defendant

is

are

in the

restrained

from

smoking marijuana and/or use of other controlled substances; she
is further restrained from having any male companions in her home
overnight.

Also, "pursuant

to the custody

and psychological

evaluations submitted to the court, the courtwill review the
custody

situation

within

one

year

from

the

date

of

this

recommendation and/or as soon as it can be scheduled by either
party thereafter with the clerk of the court.

At the time of the

review hearing, an updated report from V. Gerald -Thamert and
Richard Y. Moody is requested.

Further, if the court finds it to

be in the best interest of the children to change custody, it
will do so without finding a change of circumstances because it
is only awarding defendant temporary custody at this time.
8.

The

noncustodial

parent

is granted

reasonable

visitation with the children, which shall include, but is not
limited to the following:
a.

Every other weekend from Friday evening at

6:00 p.m. to Sunday evening at 6:00 p.m.

9

h.

The

children

they

wish

to

will

not

visit with

be

permitted

the

to

determine

whether

parent.

Personal plans of the custodial parent or children,

school activities, church activities, or other

noncustodial

considerations

will not be reasons for failing to adhere to the visitation
schedule
reasons

set
will

forth
be

in

the order.

considered

Only substantial

sufficient

for

medical

postponement

of

visitation*i.

Both

parties

will

provide

addresses

and

contact telephone numbers to the other party and will immediately
notify

the

other

party

of

any

emergency

circumstances

or

substantial changes in the health of the children.
j.

The noncustodial parent shall, in addition to

the visitation set forth in this order, have the unlimited right
to correspond with the minor children of the parties and to
telephone" the minor

children during "reasonable hours without

interference or monitoring by the custodial parent or anyone else
in any

way.

Unless otherwise agreed to between the parties,

telephone conferences between the noncustodial parent and the
children shall be limited to no more than once per week and shall
be, in total, 15 to 20 minutes or less in duration.
k.

Both parties are restrained and enjoined from

making derogatory or disparaging comments about the other party
or in any other way diminishing the love, respect, and affection
that the children have for either party.

11

9.
South

in

The parties have a home located

Beaver,

Utah.

During

the

parties

at 98 East

300

marriage,

the

plaintiff and his father and defendant's father and other family
members assisted in building the aforementioned residence.

The

home has an apparent fair market value at the present time of
about

$80,500.00-

That plaintiff's

father provided

financial

assistance in the construction of the home and closing cost in
the acquisition of the property in an approximate amount of about
$4,000.00.
The court awards defendant temporary possession of the
above described home with defendant to have the exclusive use and
occupancy thereof for the parties minor children in defendant's
custody

for

two

years

from

the

date

of

this

recommendation

pursuant to defendant's request or until such time as defendant
remarries or cohabitates, or moves from the home. During
period

this

of occupancy, defendant is~ responsible for all mortgage

payments and other costs associated with the upkeep of the home,
i.e., maintenance, taxes, etc.
Upon
enumerated
reasonbly

the occurrence

above,

the

of

residence

practicable and

the

first

should

the proceeds

be

of

the

sold

conditions
as

soon

as

of the sale applied

as

follows:
(a)

First, to pay expenses of sale;

(b)

Second, to retire any and all mortgages and liens,

including but not limited to the $4,000.00 owing to plaintiff's
father, and any amount that can be proven paid by plaintiff in

the

acquisition

of

the

lot

prior

to

his

marraige

to

the

defendant;
(c)

Last, the balance remaining

thereafter

to be

divided equally between the parties.
10.

The parties have been separated for approximately

two years; therefore, the parties have no outstanding marital
debts or obligations that needs to be considered by the court.
Thus, each party is responsible for all debts and obligations
incurred by themselves and to hold the other party harmless from
any liability.
11.

It is reasonable and proper that the parties be

required to maintain in effect a policy of dental, health and
accident insurance at all times if it is available through their
respective employers at reasonable costs, with the minor children
of the parties named as beneficiaries thereunder.

Further, each

party should pay one-half of all deductible amounts and -one-half
of all noncovered medical and dental expenses of said minor
children.

If neither party is able to supply said insurance,

each party should be responsible for the payment of one-half of
all reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses for the
minor children.
12.

Plaintiff

is

self-employed

as

a

general

contractor; however, he is presently between bids and requested
i

that the court ordered temporary support of S550.00 be reduced
and made retroactive

to August, 1988, since his petition was

filed July 29, 1988.

But plaintiff has an approximate historical
13

monthly

gross

Plaintiff

earnings

has

a

of

$1,500.00

responsibility

to

to

$1,700.00

support

per

his

month.

children;

therefore, the court may take into consideration his historical
earnings when he has suffered a temporary decrease in income as
set out in Olsen v. Olsen, 704, P.2d 564 (Utah 1985).
the court will
amount

of

$175.00

children.
1988.

Said

per

child

month

per

support

to pay child
child

for

obligation

support

in the

the parties

is effective

minor
March,

Further, the court will also deny plaintiff's request for

reduction of
basis.

require plaintiff

Therefore,

If

the amount he was ordered

plaintiff

becomes

to pay on a temporary

delinquent

in

his

ongoing

child

support obligation in an amount at least equal to child support
payable
mandatory

for

one

income

month,

then

withholding

the

defendant

relief

is

pursuant

entitled

to

Utah

to
Code

Annotated, Section 78-45d-l, et seq. (1953) as amended.
13.

In Paffel v. Paffelf 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986), the

Utah Supreme Court determined

the purpose of alimony to be to

enable the receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage and prevent that
spouse from becoming a public charge.

In considering

alimony,

the court must consider:
(1)

the

financial

condition

and

needs

of

the

receiving spouse;
(2)

the ability of the receiving spouse toproduce

a sufficient income for himself or herself;

14

(3)
support.

the ability of the paying spouse to provide

See Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah App. 1987); see

also Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669 (Utah App. 1987).
Plaintiff has a gross, historical, monthly
approximately

$1500-1700

income of approximately

while

defendant

$500.00-550.00.

has
Based

a

income of

gross

monthly

upon the

above

mentioned considerations, the court finds that the defendant is
entitled to $200.00 per month as rehabilitative alimony for four
years.
time

Defendant

period

by

is to gain the necessary skills within this

attending

school

as

suggested

in

the

custody

evaluation of Mr. Thamert.
14.

During the course of the marriage the parties have

acquired items of personal property.

Said personal property of

the parties should be distributed as follows:
(a)

To the plaintiff as indicated in defendant's

(b)

To the defendant as indicated in defendant's

exhibit D-15.

exhibit D-15.
15.

The

parties

are

mutually

restrained

from

harassing, annoying, vexing and/or interfering with the lifestyle
of the other party.
16.

Each party should be ordered to assume his/her own

costs and attorney's fees incurred in prosecutng this action.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The court concludes that the parties are subject to

the jurisdiction of the court as set out above under the court's
15

Findings of Fact and that the plaintiff is entitled to a decree
of divorce from the defendant on the grounds of mental cruelty,
the same to become final upon entry therein.
2.

The

court

concludes that

all other

issues of

dispute have been resolved by the court pursuant to the above
Findings of Fact.
3.

The parties have ten (10) days from the date of

this recommended decision to file a specific written objection
with the clerk of the court.

If no objection to the foregoing

recommendation is timely filed, counsel for plaintiff is directed
to prepare an appropriate order consistent with the foregoing
rule.
DATED at Provo, Utah, this o?<^ day of March, 1988.
RECOMMENDED BY:

cc:

G. Michael Westfall
Gary W. Pendleton
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father and such additional amount as plaintiff can prove

invested in the building lot prior to the marriage.

Plaintiff's

objection appears to be that since he worked extra hours, did the
construction himself and did trade work for the house, he should
get a lion's share of the equity.

Plaintiff testified, however,

that defendant was a good wife to him during those first five (5)
years of marriage; she cooked his meals, cleaned his house and
otherwise performed her function as his wife.

I fail to see why,

in this marital partnership, plaintiff should consider his
contribution to the house as anything extraordinary since he was
merely performing his function as a good husband.
nature of a partnership.

That is the

Objection No. 1 is overruled and denied

and that portion of the Commissioner's Recommendation is approved.
2.

Plaintiff next objects .to the commissioner's finding

on the earnings of the defendant and the award of alimony in the
amount of $200. per month for four (4) years.

A careful review of

the evidence presented at trial reveals no reason to disturb the
commissioner's findings regarding the earnings of the defendant.
Although defendant did testify that she earned $5.50 per hour
during the "ski season at Mount Holly", she was not at all clear
as to how long that job lasted.

Also, her testimony as to her

anticipated earnings after the ski season were, at best,
conjectural since she had no immediate employment prospects.

The

commissioner was well within the bounds of the evidence submitted,
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valuations set forth in Exhibits D-13 and D-15, which were the
only items of property discussed during the trial.

Although the

values are in dispute, the differences do not appear substantial
and I find the division was equitable in consideration of all the
circumstancesf including the plaintiff's purchase of the Nissan
300 ZX automobile using money which defendant felt was partially
marital in nature.

(See Trial Transcript, P 212 and 213).

Plaintiff apparently feels that the commissioner failed
to award some items of property but I find neither discussion of
nor reference to those items in. the record. If additional items of
property remain in dispute, the Court retains jurisdiction and
will deal with those items upon proper notice.
It is, therefore, the Court's intention to approve the
Commissioner's Recommendation and adopt it as the final Order and
Decree of this Court, except as to the award of alimony, which is
modified as set forth in Paragraph 2 above.
Counsel for plaintiff to prepare appropriate Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce.
DATED this

of June, 1988.
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